The Dawn of Combined Minds Doctrine
How to Think About Integrating Machines into Small Unit Tactics
We are not at the dawn of the robotics revolution, more like its the nautical twilight. After a few decades of increasingly sophisticated remotely piloted vehicles like Predator and EOD robots dominating the imagery of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the pivot to true autonomy, to the warbot, is in full swing. Last fall, I wrote on the Pentagon’s Replicator Initiative to rapidly field thousands of new drones and unmanned systems. Replicator was (and still is) fairly scant on the necessary details beyond “give me my warbots” but it has signaled a green light for defense tech companies new and old that the future of American war, and their profits, lies with man-machine teaming. Whether Replicator itself succeeds or not, the future of combat operations centers on what I’ve come to call “combined minds” doctrine, or the teaming of man with machine on the battlefield to close with and destroy the enemy.
But where does that future begin, and to whom does it belong? Well, I’d argue it lies as all warfare does with the individual. The American military is built upon the capability of the individual, and the capacity of the institution to organize that individual’s knowledge, training, fitness, and instinct into formations capable of fighting and winning battles. In the last century, the soldier increasingly arrived on the battlefield paired in some way with dumb machines steel, and then smart blends of steel and silicon. But even through GWOT, the smartest machines were still dumber than your youngest private. Precision targeting, drone strikes, and the like still required a human in the loop, and were prone to plenty of dumb mistakes. We simply lacked the ability to deploy computing power, raw power, and data-trained programs in a way that could compliment, rather than complicate, operations at scale. We need a lot of time, and trial and error, to get to the point we are now. And now a variety of factors (from budget constraints and supply chains to industrial decay and enemy quantitative advantage) demands we accelerate those lessons learned from blackboard to battlefield. The battery revolution increasingly provides opportunity for capable smart systems to actually deploy, our phones have the compute power the last generation could only dream of, and we have more data (good and bad) than we know what to do with. While we still have production issues to resolve, the engineering constraints of deploying the warbot are evaporating as the battlefields of Ukraine and elsewhere demonstrate their utility and necessity. But deploying a technology is only half the problem, the harder problem is learning how to use it faster and more effectively than the enemy does. Today, I’d like to offer up a series of thought and prompts for your consideration. The scenario is designed for the tactical leader, but this sort of thinking should help inform senior leaders, program assessors, and policy folks of all stripes when they think about the very, very near future of warfare.
The F.N.G.
Imagine you’re the new platoon sergeant of a light infantry platoon in the 101st Airborne or 10th Mountain, and your unit has been tasked with receiving and training on some new gadgets. You’ve been around the block, maybe with a couple GWOT deployments, and you’ve seen this before. The brass comes down with some costly and temperamental toy that doesn’t work in the way that the lobbyists pitched to Congress, you’re signed for it, and you have to test it without breaking it. Or else. In the old days, it would get locked away in the box as soon its price point was deemed to high to risk or it was too broken to incorporate into your train up. Well now you don’t get that choice. The Army has reduced your liability for damaged equipment, DSD Hicks herself has said these are meant to be expendable, and you’re being asked to figure out if and how this equipment can be worked into your formation. You were not trained for this, but you’ve got a decade of tactical experience and you figure you and your NCOs (and maybe the LT) can figure out how to put this warbot through the ringer and make it work for you.
The Army might’ve bought the warbot in some nice packaging, but you’ve got to bring it to the field and get it dirty. You have to maintain it, carry it, feed it, and train your soldiers on it. The good news is that unlike your privates, the warbot won’t come back from leave with a used Mustang at 19% interest or make you pick it up from jail at 0200 on a Saturday night (yet). After a few drinks and some deep contemplation, you’re willing to accept the tradeoffs of this new potential headache.
So, where do you start? Well, let me offer a few questions and considerations to make planning a little easier. Consider the following as a planning checklist for incorporating the new flood of warbots into your formation.
Now, let’s plan for that field exercise.
On the MTOE
First, where does the war bot fit in your formation, physically?
If it’s armed, say with a light or medium machine gun, does it replace or augment a gun team? What about if it carries an anti-tank weapon? Who are you tasking with maintaining it? Does it sit at the fire team, the squad, or platoon level of responsibility?
Or perhaps with manning shortfalls, bots can be prioritized to replace hard to fill roles. What’s your priority list for manning and training?
If it’s an air-capable system, what specific fires can it augment or replace?
Movement and Maneuver
Can the warbot keep pace with you and under what conditions? Can it patrol an urban area as well as rugged, tight forested terrain? Can it navigate under daytime and night conditions? What about bad weather and extreme temperatures? How will this impact your units ability to maneuver on patrol and on the objective?
Who will carry the bot into battle? Will loading it into a helicopter for an air assault or into an infantry squad vehicle impact your capacity to carry other equipment or personnel, what are the tradeoffs?
For air systems, do you need to carry it, or can it meet you somewhere while it conducts reconnaissance and overwatch? Also, what sort of deconfliction measures do you need for other fires and aircraft?
If this is a mounted mission, can the bot provide additional security and cover down on sectors of fire? How far our do you want the bots from your formation, what are the physical limitations for control (line-of-sight, datalinks, true pre-programmed nav paths, etc)
Guns, Guns, Guns
Are you more concerned with reducing the load on your soldiers or amplifying firepower? Consider the mission, where does the bot fit best? Do you need more volume from the support by fire, or do you need more assaulters (in which case the bots replace, rather than augment, the gun teams?)
Can the bot carry its own ammo, or will this add additional strain on assistant gunners and other members of the platoon? Will you have dedicated assistant gunners (AGs) when the bot is firing or can anyone fill this role? Should the AGs qualify on the bot’s weapon system as a backup?
If the bot is unarmed, can you arm it in a pinch? We’ve seen displays of duct tape remote systems from Syria to Ukraine.
The Mission, the Bot, and You
Can you leave the bot behind when the mission doesn’t require it? As with any mission, what might be necessary for a breach for example might not be necessary for reconnaissance.
How are you going to incorporate it into the mission? How does the bot impact your sound, light, and EM discipline? Where do you make the tradeoff?
How can you erm, augment, the bot to fit the mission? Surely not everything on that thing is actually necessary or functional, how can you make it functional instead of performative? Remember, the bot works if it works for you, not necessarily by how it was designed. Manuals are guidelines, get creative.
What elements of the mission can the bot substitute to improve things for your soldiers? Perhaps the bot can sit in passive detection mode in your patrol base to reduce the number of soldiers on security, ensuring other priorities of work are accomplished.
In what missions and battle drills can a bot be most effective, with the least amount of complication? When are you willing to sacrifice the warbot, and when is the warbot more capable than the soldier? How many soldiers is a warbot worth, and vice versa?
How programmable is the warbot? Can you assign sectors of fire, ROE, and target prioritization to fit the mission and specifically in the field, or does it have to be adjusted back in the read?
How can this bot be paired with others, not simply with your soldiers on the ground?
Beans, Bullets, and Bots
Adding a warbot (or a few) to your MTOE can drastically change what your sustainment plan looks like. You might run on Dunkin, the bot does not.
What are the power requirements for the bot? How long can its battery or engine last, and under what conditions, always plan for the harder option. How often can you get resupply, and do its energy requirements match the rest of the company’s? Who gets charging priority?
Within the platoon, what other systems require power, what kind of power, and do they overlap with the bots needs? How are you going to prioritize that, who is carrying that extra energy, and how can you make what you have, last?
What about maintenance supplies: tools, oils, replacement parts? Who is carrying that, how much are you carrying, how much can the bot carry, and does higher know you need it? Integrating these bots will most assuredly place greater strain on your S4 as you figure it out.
If the bot breaks down, what is your recovery plan? Can you abandon it, do you need to destroy sensitive electronics before you do, who is carrying it out if possible?
Can the bot be augmented to assist in casualty evacuation? What is its towing power if its a unmanned ground vehicle (UGV), can it carry extra medical supplies or provide cover as you triage and treat wounded, freeing up man power for the mission? How does this impact your threshold for when the platoon becomes combat ineffective?
Link Up
How is the bot controlled and programmed? Can it be used to amplify platoon comms or improve your PACE plan with other units via comms systems that traditionally couldn’t be carried with a light unit? Does it require a persistent datalink within the platoon or to external connections at higher echelons? If not, how often should or can you sync and backup data to external sources? Do they require persistent GPS data to navigate?
Existential Questions for the AAR
Is the modern US Army infantry squad (or its equivalents in other formations) compatible with the warbot? Not just in terms or augmentation or replacement, but does the squad need to be grown as the Marine Corps has done in the last few years?
At what stage of training should troops incorporate warbots? Should basic training include them as part of field training? Should soldiers be licensed on the warbots? Can units set up their own training programs like drivers training for warbots or does the Army need a special school, even if just at division level?
Which maintainers are getting trained on these warbots, when, and what constitutes 10-level (ie regular soldier) maintenance vs when the warbot needs to be kicked up to the specialists? Where do contractors fit into this equation? How are parts prioritized relative to other vehicles, do these warbots constitute pacing items for commanders?
Which units should be prioritized for warbot inclusion?
What does it mean to be expendable?
Conclusion
Pairing the common warbot with the common soldier, in an effective design and execution of new doctrine, training, and acquisitions, is the difference between the American military winning future battles and bleeding out into irrelevancy. We can’t effectively design and train large formations on man-machine teaming without first getting the basics right, and that means the integration of warbots big and small at the lowest levels. It requires everyone, from senior leaders and policymakers down to the E4 team leader, to think well and good about the integration of man and machine beyond the Terminator-ethics hysteria. Whether you like it or not, your next battle buddy might be a warbot, so start thinking well and good about how you’re gonna work together.
If you would like to read more about the future of US-China conflict, the next evolution in warfare, and what a future without man-machine teaming looks like, check out my book, EX SUPRA. It was nominated for a Prometheus Award for best science fiction novel! And if you have any suggestions for topics for future newsletters, please send them my way on Twitter @Iron_Man_Actual.