The Forgotten Firebase

Iwo Jima and the Defense of Taiwan

This week, Dimi over at the Financial Times got another scoop: The US Air Force is pulling its F-15 fighter aircraft from US bases on Okinawa in the First Island Chain. Almost immediately, the press and natsec commentators, myself included, broke out into a frenzy over USAF plans to replace that capability and what that would mean for a China fight. In this case the controversy, among those who understand WESTPAC operations, is less about moving the F-15s than the loss in capability without a viable alternative operating concept to execute. F-15s are excellent aircraft and their numbers and speed will come in handy in a fight against the PLA, they’re not obsolete. But, less than stealthy features and older electronics put them at a disadvantage when operating so close to the PRC mainland. Let’s be honest, the runways on Okinawa, which are about equally as close to Taiwan as they are the mainland at about 400-500 miles, will be cratered about 30 seconds into any conflict between the US and China. Moreover, the East China Sea will likely be flooded with powerful but stationary PLA electronic warfare and targeting systems. It won’t be a fun place to be even for aircraft with stealthier qualities. The F-15s might be able to scramble in time for a first round of sorties, but they’re just as likely to not have a runway to land on back at Okinawa. All of this is to say, moving these crucial fighters from under the gun of most PLA missiles and aircraft strike ranges is a good idea. Replacing them with a proposed rotation of F-22s or simply moving them to Northern Japan or even out of theater is not the answer. No ifs, and, or buts, about it. So that’s where my latest proposal comes in, I’d like to offer an alternative to basing fighter aircraft at Okinawa: park them on the storied island of Iwo Jima.

Source: National Land Image Information

For those who know their WWII history, Iwo Jima is the site of one of the more storied battles in Marine Corps history and is the site of the famed photograph of Marines raising the American flag over Mt. Suribachi, the very same image is captured at the Iwo Jima Memorial in Arlington, Virginia. Located about 800 miles due east of Okinawa, about 800 miles north of the US territory of Guam, and 1200 miles from Taipei, Iwo Jima remains a fatal oversight in Western Pacific war planning. Today, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces (JMSDF) maintain a small naval air station on the island but US forces have not been permanently present on the island since 1968 when it was handed back over to the Japanese government (US aircraft do occasionally make an appearance on the island for landing practice). Given its location and the growing dire need for dispersed, large airfields in the Western Pacific, the lack of a larger presence on Iwo Jima is simply criminal.

The island itself hosts an 8700 ft runway, which can and should be expanded to a 12,000ft runway with little trouble to support the US’ largest aircraft. The island has more than enough room for additional runway space, hangars, ammunition storage, radar and communications relays, and housing for troops. The beaches of Iwo Jima, through the use of Japanese US-2 seaplanes, could be used for additional operations and logistics without overloading the main runway during wartime operations. I haven’t seen any reporting on the island’s volcanic activity interfering with instrumentation or electronic systems, so I will assume this isn’t a problem, but it should be one to keep in mind. The island hosts barracks, hangars, and old ammunition storage sites, which would undoubtedly all need to be upgraded. As I’ve said before, the Army Corps of Engineers will come in handy here. with the timely delivery of supplies, a modern, fully functional US air base capable of bringing and sustaining the fight to the PLA could be up within a year.

While not exactly an island hospitable for a PCS move like Guam, with the right sense of urgency and engineering, Iwo Jima can become Guam 2.0 for wartime operations. Given that US aircraft already operate occasionally from Iwo Jima, it shouldn’t be too hard for the USG to convince the Japanese government to allow the US back permanently and/or jointly with the JMSDF. Many a horse trade can be made here, for example, the US could pay for Japanese purchases of Maritime Strike Tomahawks in exchange for a generous joint lease of the territory in the same way that we share Diego Garcia with the Brits in the Indian Ocean. The diplomacy here is frankly the lighter lift compared to the constant sparring over Okinawa or more US basing on the Japanese Home Islands. This should be a welcome expansion of US presence by all.

So what exactly does basing F-15s and other aircraft buy the US, Taiwan, and Japan in terms of security and operational capacity? Well, a few things. For one, a second Guam dramatically complicates PLA targeting and the number of expensive, long-range munitions they would have to expend in order to disrupt our operations. Moreover, it means we can dramatically raise our sortie rate in the Western Pacific in order to deny PLA air dominance over and around Taiwan, which I and many others have previously pointed out is key to stopping a quick PLA victory. The limiting factor here is the limiting factor for all of the Pacific: fuel supplies. If we can pump and store enough fuel onto Iwo Jima, this will not only reduce points of failure for air operations in the Pacific, but improve the pace of operations as the war drags on. When it comes to the F-15s specifically, these aircraft will now have a safer approach to Taiwan and the East and South China seas running east-west rather than north-south through PLA-dominated airspace. And they’ll likely have a runway to return home to when the operation is over. Even with the increased flight time and distance, the F-15 is more than capable of making the trip from Iwo Jima to Taipei and a much greater chance of surviving its transit to contested airspace. As I’ve said before, the longer it takes for the PLA to disrupt our operations, and the harder it is for them to wipe out our local forces in the early barrages, the harder it is for them to win the war before we bring the full brunt of the global US military and our allies to bear in the Western Pacific.

Image Source: Wikipedia

With Guam at the center of the Second Island Chain, Iwo Jima covering the sparse north between Guam and Japan, and Palau to the South, the US and its allies will have overlapping fields of fire and air control throughout the Second Island Chain. Therefore, Iwo Jima isn’t simply an option, it’s a necessity to control the seas beyond Taiwan and box in the PLA while ensuring open sea lines of communication between Allied Forces in Guam and Japan.

Iwo Jima is a timely, near-ready solution for a conflict in which we not only have to fight in the First Island Chain, but in which we have to fight just to get to the First Island Chain. While Iwo Jima is the most capable of the many underdeveloped islands in the Western Pacific capable of hosting US forces, it cannot be a one-off solution. Iwo Jima should become the poster child for newly renovated bases in the region, one which not only makes up for capabilities lost or challenged in the first island chain, but that augments our forces in the Second Island Chain. Rebuilding Iwo Jima into another Guam or Diego Garcia is simply common sense for wartime operations, and far more politically palatable than most potential outposts in the region. The battle for the skies over Taiwan begins on the sands of Iwo Jima.

If you would like to read more about the future of US-China conflict, the invasion of Taiwan, and what the world looks like if Taiwan falls, check out my novel, EX SUPRA. And if you have any suggestions for topics for future newsletters, please send them my way on Twitter @Iron_Man_Actual.